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The Democratic victories in the 2020 elections have raised the prospect of 
a unified Congress and executive branch committed to a robust civil rights 
agenda.  In addition to policing, voting rights, and racial justice legislation more 
generally, one should add women’s rights to the likely legislative list: then-
Senator Biden led the effort to enact the Violence Against Women Act, part 
of which was struck down in 2000,
1
 and one can expect his Administration to 
prioritize strengthening women’s rights initiatives, especially in light of the 
#MeToo movement.  Finally, the continued push for LGBT rights will likely 
place sexual orientation and transgender identity on that agenda as well.
2
  As 
this article is being edited in the summer of 2021, this work is already 
underway. 
As Congress and the President get down to this business, however, they 
will confront both a skeptical Supreme Court and hostile Supreme Court 
precedent.  As to the first, the current Court has made clear its skepticism 
about aggressive civil rights legislation.
3
  While Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, 
and Barrett joined the Court only recently, there is little reason to believe that 
they will depart from that general skepticism.  More broadly, there is no reason 
to think that these new justices, and the Court they will shape, will shrink from 
protecting both their own law-declaring authority and what they believe to be 
states’ sovereign prerogatives against any perceived threat from federal civil 
rights legislation. 
Beyond the Court’s composition lies its doctrine. Nearly a quarter-century 
has passed since City of Boerne v. Flores4 announced a stricter test for 
evaluating federal legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
5
  Even 
though later applications of Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” 
standard split heavily along ideological lines,
6
 Boerne itself enjoyed broad 
 
 1 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
2  See infra note 122 (citing source explaining the impetus behind current LGBT rights legislation). 
 3 See, e.g. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a critical component of the 
1965 Voting Rights Act because of skepticism about Congress’s factual record and solicitude for 
states’ “equal sovereignty”); but see Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (interpreting 
the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as encompassing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and transgender status). 
 4 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress “to enforce” the rest of the amendment 
“by appropriate legislation”). 
 6 See Coleman v. Ct. of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Bd. of 
Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); 
August 2021] LEFT/RIGHT 715 
ideological support on the Court.
7
  Even more significantly, Boerne and its 
subsequent stringent applications appear to have become stable precedent; in 
2020, Justice Kagan wrote an opinion for seven justices reaffirming the 
congruence and proportionality standard, and in particular, one of the closely-
divided cases applying that standard, to strike down a copyright law’s 
application to states.
8
  The remaining two justices, who had dissented in that 
earlier case that Justice Kagan applied, recognized that they had lost the battle 
and concurred in the result.
9
 
The emerging picture thus combines political branches primed to enact 
significant civil rights legislation with a skeptical Court wielding now-
longstanding precedent limiting the enforcement power.
10
  This prospect raises 
important questions about the relationship between the Court and the political 
branches in the project of safeguarding individual rights.  This would not be 
the first time the political branches have collided with either a Supreme Court 
majority and/or a body of judicial precedent on individual rights issues.  The 
most famous example of such a collision was the Lochner-era Court’s battle 
against the New Deal, a tale told many times.
11
  To be sure, that battle featured 
a Court that saw itself as protecting individual rights against assertions of state 
 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (all 5–4 
decisions, with all of them falling along the familiar liberal-conservative axis except for Lane, which 
fell along that axis except for Justice O’Connor’s agreement with the Court’s liberals); but see Nev. 
Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (6–3 vote). 
 7 Six justices, spanning the ideological spectrum from Justices Thomas to Ginsburg, joined the majority 
opinion in Boerne.  Justice O’Connor would have joined it except for her disagreement with the 
Court’s application of its underlying Free Exercise Clause doctrine, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544–45 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer appeared to agree with at least some of Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement of the majority’s enforcement power analysis, see id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Justice Souter did not join the opinion, again because of disagreement with the underlying free 
exercise doctrine the majority took as a starting point.  However, he expressed no opinion about the 
majority’s enforcement power analysis.  See id. at 564 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 8 Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (applying Florida Prepaid, supra. note 6, which struck down 
a federal law regulating state trademark infringements as exceeding the enforcement power, to an 
analogous federal copyright law). 
 9 See id. at 1008–09 (Breyer, J., concurring) (disagreeing with Florida Prepaid, but conceding that his 
view “has not carried the day.”  Id.  Notably, of the then-four justice liberal bloc, the two who were 
not on the Court in Florida Prepaid (Kagan and Sotomayor) respectively wrote and joined the 
majority opinion.  This suggests that, indeed, the view expressed by the Florida Prepaid dissenters 
“has not carried the day.”  Id. 
 10 Certainly, federal civil rights legislation can take the form of legislation the constitutionality of which 
is uncontroversial.  For example, in the wake of police violence against communities of color, calls 
have arisen for strengthening constitutional tort remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See, e.g., Lynda 
G. Dodd, What’s missing in the police reform debate (Part 2), BALKINIZATION (October 20, 2015), 
available at https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/10/whats-missing-in-police-reform-debate_20.html. 
 11 See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
716 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:4 
and federal regulatory prerogatives.
12
  But other episodes have featured 
congressional contemplation of legislative action aimed at protecting 
individual rights in the face of anticipated conflict with either the Court or its 
precedent. 
This Article examines four of those episodes to determine what they teach 
us today, as the nation stands at the threshold of a similar conflict.  Part I 
begins by briefly laying out the doctrinal context—especially, but not only, the 
Court’s doctrine governing Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
13
  It then introduces three general approaches Congress might 
take when seeking to ground civil rights legislation on a firm constitutional 
foundation despite the existence of a skeptical Court or hostile precedent: 
challenging unfavorable precedent, avoiding it by relying on a different 




Part II considers four instances of congressional deliberation—over what 
became the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s public accommodations provisions,
15
 the 
private right of action provided by the 1994 Violence Against Women Act,
16
 
and the 2003 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,
17
 as well as thus-far unenacted 
legislation prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation 
(and, in later iterations, gender identity)
18
—to uncover what those debates offer 
by way of lessons for congressional action over the next several years.  Each of 
these examples confronted a slightly different judicial and doctrinal backdrop 
to the desired legislative action, and each reflects a different ultimate 
constitutional strategy settled on by Congress. 
Based on those case studies, Part III evaluates the challenge, avoidance, 
and application strategies.  It concludes that each strategy holds both promise 
and peril for Congress.  In particular, it concludes that, while the application 
strategy appears the safest and most straightforward, it is by no means 
 
 12 See, e.g., DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Univ. of Chicago Press 2011) (explaining the Lochner-era Court 
in this way).  Of course, those challenged state and federal regulatory programs were often cast in 
terms of individual rights more broadly construed, for example, workers’ right to organize.  See, e.g., 
REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (New York Univ. Press 2006) (framing the National Labor 
Relations Act as vindicating workers’ quasi-constitutional rights). 
 13 See infra Part I.A. 
 14 See infra Part I.B. 
 15 Infra note 36. 
 16 Infra note 37. 
 17 Infra note 38. 
 18 Infra note 39. 
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foolproof or risk free.  Part IV briefly evaluates the implications of Part III’s 
analysis.  It concludes that the risks posed by each of these strategies requires 
Congress to think long and hard as it deliberates on the proper constitutional 
foundation for whatever civil rights legislation it is disposed to consider. 
I. RIGHTS-ENFORCING LEGISLATION: MULTIPLE ROUTES TO THE 
SAME DESTINATION AND THE CHOICES THEY PRESENT 
A. Multiple Routes to the Same Destination 
Congress possesses broad legislative powers.  Today, judicial scrutiny of 
congressional power to enact a particular piece of legislation focuses on the 
law’s subject-matter rather than Congress’s underlying goals.  Thus, for 
example, Congress may use its taxing power to impose a tax for regulatory 
purposes, if the law raises at least some revenue.
19
  More relevantly for current 
purposes, Congress can use its power to regulate interstate commerce to 
promote civil rights, as long as Congress promotes that goal by regulating 
interstate commerce or conduct that substantially affects it.
20
 
While these developments provide Congress the flexibility to utilize a 
broad array of powers to promote individual rights, that flexibility has also 
triggered complaints about the resulting mismatch between regulatory goals 
and the tools employed to achieve them.  Two generations ago, Justice 
Douglas criticized the Court’s use of the dormant Commerce Clause to 
invalidate a state law criminalizing the importation of indigent persons, arguing 
“that the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more 
protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of 
cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.”
21
  That concern led him to base 
his concurrence on the Fourteenth Amendment right to interstate travel.
22
  
Justice Jackson also concurred separately, for essentially the same reason.
23
  
But Jackson added an element to Justice Douglas’s critique when he expressed 
 
 19 See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (“It is beyond serious question that a tax 
does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the 
activities taxed.  The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or 
the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.”) (citations omitted). 
 20 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).  This understanding 
rejects an older view that disabled Congress from enacting even facial regulations of interstate 
commerce if Congress sought to promote a goal other than remedying problems with such commerce 
itself.  See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (adopting this older understanding), overruled 
by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (stating the modern rule). 
 21 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177–78 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 22 See id. 
 23 See id. at 181 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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concern about the likely effect of the majority’s use of the Commerce Clause 
on both the commerce power itself and the legal status of individual rights.
24
 
Congress’s explicit power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments
25
—
most notably, its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
26
—provides a 
more direct path for Congress to protect rights.  However, the diverging 
doctrinal paths taken by the Court’s Article I and enforcement power 
doctrines have caused Congress to refrain from reflexively relying on its 
enforcement power when considering rights-protecting legislation.  Most 
notably, the Court has long insisted that the power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment limits Congress to regulation of state action,
27
 while Congress’s 
Article I powers focus primarily (though not exclusively) on regulation of 
private entities.
28
  Another difference relates to the remedies available to 
Congress when it legislates under these two different grants of authority.
29
  
Tracking the distinction between Commerce Clause-based federal regulation 
of the states and regulation of private parties, Congress’s spending power also 
faces special limits when employed to grant money to states on the condition 
that recipient states take certain action.
30
 
Perhaps most importantly, each of these powers differs from the others in 
the doctrinal tests that measure the scope of each power.  While the Court has 
 
 24 See id. at 182 (“[T]he migrations of a human being, of whom it is charged that he possesses nothing 
that can be sold and has no wherewithal to buy, do not fit easily into my notions as to what is 
commerce.  To hold that the measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually 
either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights.”). 
 25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2. 
 26 Because this power resides in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, this article sometimes refers 
to that power as “the Section 5” power.  Otherwise, references to the “enforcement power” or the 
“Enforcement Clause” should be understood as referring to the Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
 27 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 28 Indeed, one of the basic goals of the Constitutional Convention was to create a national government 
that acted directly on individual Americans, rather than on the states. Today, Article I legislation 
regulating states encounters limits that are inapplicable to legislation regulating private parties.  See 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (prohibiting Commerce Clause-based regulation 
that commandeers state governments); Seminole Tribe v. Fla. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (prohibiting 
Commerce Clause-based regulation that makes unconsenting states liable for retrospective relief in 
federal court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending the Seminole Tribe rule to state court 
lawsuits); see also Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (limiting the substance of 
federal regulation when that regulation acts on states), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 29 Compare Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (restricting remedies legislated pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause when they act upon unconsenting states) with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976) (allowing such remedies when the law rests on Congress’s enforcement power).  
 30 See S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-212 (1987) (identifying several conditions that must be satisfied 
in order for Congress to condition money it grants to states). 
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trimmed Congress’s commerce and spending powers around the edges
31
 and 
introduced uncertainty into what had been settled areas of law,
32
 those powers 
remain largely intact from their mid-twentieth Century heights, while the 




B. The Necessity of Congressional Choice 
The differences identified above have influenced Congress’s deliberations 
about the constitutional foundation of individual rights legislation.  Those 
deliberations illustrate three strategies Congress has employed when 
confronting Supreme Court personnel or doctrine that appear potentially 
hostile to its constitutional authority. 
One obvious response to such judicial hostility is to join issue and mount 
a frontal challenge to judicial doctrine obstructing Congress’s desired policy.  
Such a challenge entails Congress enacting the legislation it desires, and 
grounding it squarely in the constitutional power that judicial doctrine limits.  
As set forth in the case studies Part II examines, such challenges are high-risk 
but also high-return moves: if the challenge succeeds, Congress has removed 
the objectionable doctrine, but if it loses, that doctrine remains in place, 
indeed, reaffirmed.  Moreover, if the challenge lacked a fallback argument 
based in another congressional power, a losing challenge means that the 
legislation in question is struck down, with whatever immediate and long-term 
wounds that loss inflicts. 
Given these risks, an obvious alternative to challenges entails avoiding the 
problematic doctrine by relying on a different congressional power.  
Avoidance removes the risk inherent in challenging unfavorable doctrine.  But 
it also removes whatever long-term reward might flow from a successful 
challenge.  More immediately, avoidance raises whatever risks are inherent in 
 
 31 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding that Congress lacked the 
Commerce Clause power to enact the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act); 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (holding that the civil cause of action provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act exceeded the commerce power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same, 
with regard to the Gun Free School Zones Act); but see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
(upholding a provision of the Controlled Substances Act criminalizing possession of home-grown 
and consumed marijuana); Nat’l Fed’n., 567 U.S. at 575–85 (Roberts, C.J., joined by two justices); 
id. at 671–691 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by three justices) (all voting to strike down the conditional 
spending aspect of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, holding that the condition was 
unconstitutionally coercive). 
 32 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (conceding the existence of that uncertainty in Commerce Clause 
doctrine). 
 33 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 507. 
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invoking the alternative power.  While that latter observation might seem 
nothing more than a truism, it bears wondering whether the Court—in 
particular, a Court that is suspicious of Congress
34
—might exhibit skepticism of 
that alternative power argument exactly because it suspects a congressional 
attempt to circumvent the limits on the more obvious source of congressional 
power.  That suspicion might provoke cutbacks on that alternative power, 
which in turn would apply more broadly. 
Given that risk, a third strategy—”application”—presents itself.  An 
application strategy means what the label says: Congress does not avoid the 
power in question, nor does it challenge the Court’s understanding of that 
power—rather, it justifies its legislation as an application of judicial doctrine 
governing that power.  The application approach has much to recommend it.  
It is modest, but still forthright about the civil rights goals Congress seeks to 
achieve.  It also fits neatly into the Court’s otherwise-restrictive post-Boerne 
enforcement power template, which recognizes Congress’s authority to enact 
prophylactic legislation extending beyond Court-stated Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence as long as it refrains from redefining it.
35
  But even 
this power raises difficult questions that limit its effectiveness. 
Part II of this Article presents four case studies of legislation either fully or 
partially justified as rights-enforcing.  These case studies illustrate the coping 
mechanisms described above.  Part III then evaluates those mechanisms 
based on those case studies. 
II. CASE STUDIES 
This Part examines four case studies of congressional deliberations on civil 
rights legislation from the last half-century: the public accommodations 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
36
 the private right of action granted 
by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
37
 the ENDA and Equality Acts 
 
 34 See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 189 
(2011) (“[T]he Court is increasingly suspicious of ‘fact-finding’ that allows Congress to change the 
balance of the constitutional structure.”).  If anything, this suspicion has only grown since 2011.  See, 
e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a critical provision of the Voting 
Rights Act’s reauthorization because Congress used old data). 
 35 See text accompanying infra note 139. 
 36 Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241.  Unless the context indicates otherwise, this article sometimes 
refers to those provisions as “the Civil Rights Act” or the “CRA.”  Of course, that statute addressed 
much more than public accommodations discrimination.  See 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=97 (summarizing the main features of the 
law). 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 13981.  This provision, which this Article sometimes shorthands as “VAWA,” gave 
victims of gender-motivated crime a private right of action against their attackers.  As did the Civil 
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considered over the last quarter-century,
38
 and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban 
Act of 2003.
39
  These bills required Congress to consider the appropriate 
constitutional foundation for rights-promoting legislation.
40
  Each situation was 
slightly different, and thus implicated different considerations as Congress 
sought to adapt the legislation, and its constitutional grounding, to both the 
Court’s personnel and its doctrine. 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 196441 
1. The Constitutional Backdrop in 1963 
By 1963, Congress and the Kennedy Administration were primed to 
consider the first significant civil rights legislation since Reconstruction.
42
  
Advocates and pro-civil rights legislators planned to include in that legislation 
public accommodations non-discrimination provisions.  Locating a 
constitutional foundation for such provisions presented them with an 
interesting problem.  On the one hand, the Civil Rights Cases43 appeared to 
reject the idea that the enforcement power authorized Congress to regulate 
private parties.  The existence of that longstanding precedent—even in the early 
1960s it was two generations old—seemed to place a difficult hurdle in front of 
any attempt to ground any public accommodations provisions on the 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.  On the other hand, the mid-
century Court’s tentative undermining of the state action rule raised hopes that 
the Warren Court’s increasingly liberal tilt, when combined with the pressure 
of the then-current lunch-counter sit-in cases, would prompt the justices to 
grasp the opportunity to overrule that precedent if confronted with a federal 




Rights Act, see supra. note 36, the Violence Against Women Act did more than provide this right of 
action.  However, unless the context indicates otherwise, references to “VAWA” are to this particular 
provision. 
 38 These bills, never enacted, would have prohibited most employment discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and, in later iterations, gender identity.  See, e.g., S.B. 815 § 4(a) (113th Cong.). 
 39 Pub. L. No. 108–105, 117 Stat. 1201. 
 40 Obviously, the 2003 abortion law is easily understandable as a rights-restricting law; indeed, it was 
challenged (unsuccessfully) on exactly that ground.  Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  But 
its proponents saw it, at least in part, through the lens of promoting fetal rights.  That perspective—
indeed, the very fact that the legislation could be seen both as rights-restricting and rights-promoting—
makes it an interesting subject for study. 
 41 This discussion relies heavily on Schmidt, infra note 163. 
 42 Modest civil rights statutes had been enacted in 1957 and 1960, the former of which was the first civil 
rights statute enacted by Congress since Reconstruction. 
 43 109 U.S. at 3. 
 44 See Schmidt, infra note 163 at 784 (noting the speculation raised by the mid-Century Court’s tentative 
retreat from a rigid state action rule).  Indeed, Professor Schmidt has concluded from a review of the 
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Competing with that option was the Commerce Clause.  By the early 1960s 
the nation was two decades removed from the seminal opinions of the late 
1930s and early 1940s that vastly expanded the reach of Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce.  Still, the laws that prompted those opinions 
were direct regulations of the marketplace, motivated by economic 
considerations.
45
  Nevertheless, in 1941 the Court rejected the idea that a non-
commerce motivation for a federal law removed the Commerce Clause as a 
source of power for that law.
46
  Moreover, cases from that era construed 
Congress’s other Article I powers in ways also deemphasizing Congress’s 
motivation.
47
  The Kennedy Administration’s Solicitor General, Archibald 
Cox, expressed confidence that a public accommodations bill would be 
upheld under the commerce power.
48
 
2. Choosing the Commerce Clause 
While both constitutional foundations appeared at least plausible, during 
1963 the Kennedy Administration gradually shifted its primary focus from the 
enforcement power to the commerce power.  While the former enjoyed the 
political advantage of appealing to Republicans who still claimed the 
Fourteenth Amendment as their historical legacy,
49
 and while it also appeared 
most logical given the bill’s civil rights motives,
50
 expert legal advice counseled 
against primary reliance on the enforcement power.  Those experts worried 
about the integrity of the federal courts if legislation greatly expanding the class 
of entities subject to the Fourteenth Amendment forced the Court to 
harmonize such an expansion with its own judicial doctrine.  For example, 
Harvard professor Paul Freund’s congressional testimony warned that 
grounding the bill in the Enforcement Clause would raise difficult questions 
about that law’s effect on the Court’s self-executing Section 1 doctrine.  Freund 
assumed that principles underlying Section 5 legislation would also apply in 
Section 1 adjudication.
51
  Thus, for example, abrogation of the state action 
 
justices’ papers that a majority, and potentially all, of them were in the early 1960s willing to uphold 
enforcement legislation jettisoning the doctrine. See id. at 803–804. 
 45 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding a law regulating agricultural 
production); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding a law regulating manufacturing 
of items with poorly-paid labor); Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
(upholding a law regulating labor relations in a manufacturing facility). 
 46 See supra note 20. 
 47 See supra note 19. 
 48 See Schmidt, infra note 163 at 813. 
 49 See Schmidt, infra note at 811. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1187. 
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principle by Congress would mean that the private parties Congress thereby 
regulated would be susceptible to all Fourteenth Amendment requirements in 
Section 1 litigation.  
While Freund’s testimony later backtracked somewhat,
52
 the Kennedy 
Administration adopted this argument as it gradually shifted toward the 
Commerce Clause approach.  In the fall of 1963, Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy reiterated Freund’s concern that an enforcement power grounding 
for the bill would greatly limit the realm of private liberty if the bill’s 
Fourteenth Amendment-based coverage of private entities thereby subjected 
those entities to the Fourteenth Amendment for all purposes.  He raised the 
specter of a private business that, because its customer selection practices were 
covered by an enforcement power-based bill, would also have to satisfy due 
process if it wished to fire an employee, or a religious school that, again, if 
covered by the bill’s enforcement power-based anti-discrimination provisions, 
would be prohibited from conducting Bible readings.
53
  By contrast, the 
commerce power option allowed Congress near-complete control over the 
bill’s scope without raising any broader implications.
54
 
To be sure, the Administration’s primary concern was with the more 
practical issue of limiting the businesses the bill would cover, in order to ensure 
political support from congressional moderates.  Pending in the fall of 1963 
was a proposal covering a wide variety of private businesses that operated 
through state-granted licenses, with that licensure furnishing the justification 
for use of the enforcement power.  Seeking to head off that Fourteenth 
Amendment-based expansion in the bill’s coverage, the Administration 
expressed the concern, noted above, about the unintended consequences of 
using the enforcement power.  That political maneuver succeeded, and 
legislators converged on a more limited coverage formula for public 
accommodations, based in the commerce power.  The Court quickly and 
unanimously upheld the public accommodations provision under the 
Commerce Clause.
55
  Still, despite the justices’ strong support for allowing 
Congress to enact enforcement legislation dispensing with the state action 
 
 52 See Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1189 (suggesting a decoupling of rules enacted in Section 5 
legislation from rules applicable in analogous Section 1 litigation). 
 53 See Schmidt, infra note 163, at 816. 
 54 See Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1187 (“The Commerce Clause ‘is primarily a grant of 
legislative power to Congress, which can be exercised in large or small measure, flexibly, 
pragmatically, tentatively, progressively, while guaranteed rights, if they are declared to be conferred 
by the Constitution, are not to be granted or withheld in fragments.’”), quoted in Schmidt, infra note, 
163  at 813. 
 55 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 241; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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requirement,
56
 the Warren Court never again got a clear opportunity to 
confront the state action question. 
B. VAWA 
1. The Doctrinal Backdrop and Application Strategy 
Three decades later, the Congress considering VAWA confronted a very 
different doctrinal backdrop.  In retrospect, it is clear that VAWA arose at the 
very end of the period featuring the most expansive understanding of 
congressional power in our history, and on the cusp of the federalism 
revolution of 1990s.  In the early 1990s, the most recent precedents governing 
Congress’s commerce and enforcement powers suggested VAWA would 
encounter little constitutional difficulty.
57
  United States v. Lopez,58 which 
began the Court’s ultimately-tentative cutback on the commerce power, lay in 
the future,
59
 as did the Court’s limitation on Article I-grounded remedies on 
state violators of federal law.
60
  City of Boerne v. Flores’s cutback on the 
enforcement power lay similarly in the future.
61
 
Given that doctrinal backdrop, one can understand the different tone of 
legislators’ and experts’ deliberations about the constitutional foundation for 
VAWA’s private right of action, as compared with its earlier deliberations 
about the CRA’s public accommodations provisions.
62
  Academic experts 
 
 56 See supra note 44. 
 57 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (upholding, as Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement legislation, the Voting Rights Act’s restrictions on state voting practices by 
historically-discriminatory jurisdictions that produced racially disparate impacts, even though the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited only intentional racial discrimination, because Congress could have 
“rationally” concluded that actions producing such effects risked being infected by invidious intent); 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding a federal law 
regulating coal mining reclamation as valid regulation under the Commerce Clause, employing 
similarly deferential review). 
 58 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 59 To be sure, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Lopez striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act came 
down in 1993, during the period Congress was deliberating on VAWA.  However, critical parts of 
that deliberation occurred in 1991, before the appellate decision in Lopez and, indeed, even before 
the conduct at issue in Lopez occurred.  Compare infra note 74 (citing an October 1991 
congressional report reprinting a version of the bill inserting findings relating to VAWA’s commerce 
and enforcement power foundations) with United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), 
aff’d, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (noting that the alleged conduct occurred in 1992). 
 60 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44 (prohibiting Congress from using its Commerce Clause power to 
make unconsenting states liable for retrospective relief); College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 666 
(holding that a state did not impliedly consent to the imposition of retrospective relief for violating a 
federal statute when it engaged in conduct that statute regulated). 
 61 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 62 An additional reason for this different tone was the view that VAWA was less vulnerable than the 
CRA to the Civil Rights Cases’ state action rule, since VAWA was designed to respond to state 
August 2021] LEFT/RIGHT 725 
testifying about the VAWA provision’s constitutionality expressed little worry 
about its validity under the Commerce Clause, with one of them exchanging 
humorous banter with a senator about the laxity of the requirement that 
Commerce Clause-based legislation exhibit a rational connection to interstate 
commerce.
63
  To be sure, Professor Cass Sunstein, one of the testifying experts, 
did suggest adding findings documenting the connection between gender-
motivated violence and interstate commerce.
64
  While he did not explicitly 
explain the reason for his suggestion, the context in which he made it indicates 
that he was urging Congress to hew as closely as possible to the CRA’s 
example, which featured findings connecting racial discrimination in public 
accommodations with interstate commerce.
65
 
Interestingly, Professor Sunstein expressed slightly less certainty about the 
breadth of the enforcement power.  He noted the well-known pair of 
rationales Justice Brennan had proffered to uphold the enforcement 
legislation challenged in Katzenbach v. Morgan:66 the “substantive” theory that 
purported to authorize Congress to act on its own independent interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the “remedial” theory that still gave 
Congress broad power, but only to remedy judicially-acknowledged 
constitutional violations.
67
  Professor Sunstein characterized the first 
justification as one that no Court subsequent to Morgan had ever accepted, 
but he nevertheless concluded that the more restrained, remedial reading 
would likely support the law, as long as Congress “emphasize[d] legislative 
findings of equal protection violations”
68
 that would justify VAWA’s civil 
remedy. 
 
governments’ failure to prosecute gender-motivated crime.  Ultimately, this rationale for VAWA’s 
conformance with that rule failed.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (striking down VAWA’s civil 
remedy provision as exceeding Congress’s enforcement power, mainly because that provision 
regulated private parties).  Nevertheless, enforcement power doctrine between the CRA and VAWA 
(and thus, before Morrison) had changed as well, in ways favorable to enforcement legislation. While 
the Court was never squarely confronted with the opportunity to overrule the Civil Rights Cases, see 
supra Part II.A, the Court nevertheless embraced a much expanded conception of the enforcement 
power in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).  Morgan, which formed part of the doctrinal 
backdrop to Congress’s deliberations on VAWA, suggested that VAWA’s civil remedy provision was 
likely constitutional, especially given the argument that that provision responded to sexually 
discriminatory state law enforcement.  See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, 102nd 
Cong. 118–22 [hereinafter “April 1991 Hearing”] (statement of Cass Sunstein). 
 63 April 1991 Hearing at 108. 
 64 See id. at 108–109. 
 65 See id. at 116–117. 
 66 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 67 April 1991 Hearing, supra note 62, at 120–122. 
 68 Id. at 121. The context of his comments indicate that he made this suggestion, at least in part, to 
dissuade Congress from relying on its power to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause, given 
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Beyond these details, Congress’s deliberations about VAWA reflect a 
fundamental difference between the circumstances confronting that legislation 
and those surrounding the CRA.  The CRA confronted Congress with a stark 
choice between a fairly secure Commerce Clause foundation and an 
enforcement power argument that, while rhetorically and politically attractive 
to some,
69
 entailed some measure of risk and complication.
70
  By contrast, 
VAWA’s closer connection to state action seemed at the time to make its 
enforcement power path more secure than the CRA’s,
71
 while the CRA cases 
themselves
72
 seemed to conclusively secure the Commerce Clause path.  Thus, 
for the Congresses considering VAWA, the challenge was simply to craft the 
statute—and in particular, any findings supporting it—to conform with what 
seemed, in the early 1990s, the generous amounts of power the Enforcement 
and Commerce Clauses both gave Congress.  In this sense, one can 
understand Congress, and the experts advising it, as embracing an application 
strategy. 
Congress’s deliberations reveal an additional point. Professor Sunstein’s 
testimony observed that the equal protection enforcement theory he 
recommended obviated the need “to ask the complex, controversial, and 
unresolved question whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows 
Congress to reach purely private action.”
73
  His attempt to shift focus away from 
that issue can be understood as an avoidance strategy. 
Nevertheless, these strategies failed. 
2. The Court’s Response 
Several months later, the Senate produced a version of the bill that 
included findings relevant to the VAWA provision’s Enforcement Clause and 
 
what he believed to be the more difficult enforcement power question that reliance would raise. See 
id. at 122 and 122 n.*. 
 69 See text accompanying supra note 49. 
 70 See text accompanying supra notes 51–54. 
 71 Nevertheless, the Court rejected VAWA’s enforcement power foundation. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 72 Supra note 55. 
 73 April 1991 Hearing, supra note 62 at 122. It is unclear why he thought an equal protection grounding, 
as opposed to the privileges and immunities grounding reflected in the then-current version of the 
bill, would obviate the private action question. Section 301 of the then-existing bill found that “[a]ll 
persons within the United States shall have the same rights, privileges and immunities in every State 
as is enjoyed by all other persons to be free from crimes of violence motivated by the victim’s gender.” 
See id. at 399. Perhaps he thought that emphasizing those rights necessarily focused attention on the 
private perpetrators of such violence, rather than on their state enablers, with the result that such a 
focus would raise the Section 5 state action issue. 
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Commerce Clause foundations.
74
  Those findings eventually disappeared from 
the bill that was eventually enacted in 1994.
75
  But the lack of formal findings 
ultimately played only a secondary role in the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
the provision’s enforcement power grounding.
76
 
Addressing the enforcement power argument, the Court acknowledged 
Congress’s “voluminous record” of evidence identifying gender bias in law 
enforcement.  But it also cited a more fundamental problem: the provision 
regulated private parties (by giving victims of gender-based violence a cause of 
action against their attackers), and thus violated the rule, dating from the Civil 
Rights Cases, limiting enforcement legislation to laws regulating government 
actors.
77
  The Court acknowledged that the VAWA provision responded to 
states’ failure to prosecute gender-motivated assaults, but it concluded that the 
remedy—the provision of a private right of action—failed Boerne’s 
“congruence and proportionality” test exactly because it regulated private 
parties.
78
  The Court rejected the argument that the cases establishing that rule 
could be distinguished by the lack of state involvement in the underlying 




Mapping this analysis onto the congressional strategies Part I identified,
80
 




 74 See S. REP. NO. 102–97, at 27-28 (1991) (reprinting Section 301(a) of the amended version of 
VAWA, which included findings relating to state violations of equal protection and the interstate 
commerce effects of gender-motivated violence).  Cf. April 1991 Hearing at 398–99 (prior version of 
Section 301(a), lacking such findings).  See also Victoria Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and 
Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 15 WISC. WOMEN’S L. J. 
257, 281 (2000) (noting this sequence). 
 75 Those findings were deleted in the House-Senate conference, according to a Senate staffer, for 
reasons unrelated to their substance.  See Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet, 
at 292. 
 76 But see infra note 79. 
 77 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621–22. 
 78 Id. at 626 (stating, immediately after reciting the congruence and proportionality test, that “Section 
13981 is not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might 
not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed 
criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”). 
 79 See id. at 624–25.  To be sure, the record compiled by Congress did matter to the enforcement 
power analysis in one small way: almost as an afterthought, the Court concluded its Section 5 analysis 
by observing that the provision applied nationwide, even though Congress’s evidence did not reveal 
a nationwide problem with gender-biased law enforcement.  See id. at 626–27. 
 80 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 81 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 664–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that earlier precedent striking 
down enforcement power legislation regulating private parties had described that legislation as 
responding to purely private conduct, not state government failures); id. at 665–66 (arguing that the 
Court had never required Congress to prove that a constitutional problem existed in every state as a 
condition of enacting enforcement legislation applicable in every state). 
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of the state action rule frustrated the application and avoidance strategies by 
moving the goalposts—that is, altering the underlying law Congress had 
attempted to apply (and partially avoid
82
).  The Court read the Nineteenth 
Century cases enforcing the state action rule as involving situations, just like 
VAWA, where state action lay behind the private conduct.  But those cases 
did not have to be thus read: rather, as Justice Breyer argued in dissent,
83
 they 
could have been read as situations where, unlike VAWA, “state action” was 
absent.  Thus, as Professor Sunstein suggested in his testimony, VAWA could 




This understanding of Morrison teaches a larger lesson: For a Court 
committed to an agenda—as the late Rehnquist Court was committed to a 
federalism agenda—even an application strategy may fail if it threatens that 
underlying agenda.  VAWA’s use of the enforcement power threatened that 
agenda, by opening new vistas for enforcement power-based regulation of 
private conduct in response to state government misconduct.  Morrison’s 
enforcement power analysis reflects the Court’s response to a threat it 
perceived from a strategy as modest as application. 
So does Morrison’s Commerce Clause analysis.  After Congress took 
Professor Sunstein’s advice and created a record documenting the interstate 
commerce effects of gender-motivated violence, the Court refused to give that 
record decisive effect.  It reasoned that doing so would frustrate the Court’s 
agenda of demarcating a sphere of conduct exclusively regulable by states.
85
  
Thus, even though in Lopez the Court had suggested that it might uphold 
aggressive Commerce Clause regulation if Congress provided findings linking 
the regulated activity to interstate commerce,
86
 in Morrison the Court retracted 
that commitment.  Thus, just as with the enforcement power, the Court 
frustrated Congress’s strategy of “applying” existing Commerce Clause 
doctrine by altering that doctrine.  Importantly for current purposes, that 
alteration may well have been provoked by that very act of application. 
 
 82 See supra note 73. 
 83 See supra note 81. 
 84 See April 1991 Hearings, supra note 62 at 122 (“On the argument outlined above, Congress is 
responding to an equal protection problem in the administration of state and local law by state and 
local governmental authorities. It is not responding to private acts at all . . . .”). 
 85 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (“In these cases, Congress’ findings are substantially weakened by the 
fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if 
we are to maintain the Constitution’s enumeration of powers.”). 
 86 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (explaining that findings might demonstrate a connection between 
regulated conduct and interstate commerce that was not “visible to the naked eye”). 
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C. ENDA 
1. The Evolving Doctrinal Context 
Congress faced a different and evolving set of issues when it considered 
the constitutionality of legislation restricting sexual orientation (and, in later 
iterations, gender identity) discrimination in employment.  Such legislation—
usually entitled ENDA and, later, the Equality Act—was introduced first in 
1974 and reintroduced with increasing frequency over time.
87
 
Even limiting our examination to the last thirty years reveals that 
Congress’s deliberations on ENDA’s constitutionality spanned very different 
doctrinal eras.  Most importantly, the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida88 removed the Commerce Clause as a source of 
authority for ENDA provisions rendering state government employers liable 
for retrospective relief.
89
  Seminole Tribe limited Congress’s options.  A 
challenge to that case was implausible. Seminole Tribe was a recent decision—
unlike the Civil Rights Cases, it was not an old chestnut handed down by a 
long-ago Court facing a different world that Congress could reasonably suspect 
the current Court would be willing to reconsider.  Indeed, while Seminole 
Tribe was decided by a slim 5-4 majority, that same majority proved durable, 
ruling for states in a long series of federalism cases decided from the mid-
1990s to the early 2000s.
90
  Unlike the Civil Rights Cases in the early 1960s, 
throughout the period in question here Congress had no reason to think that 
a challenge to Seminole Tribe might succeed. 
Avoidance remained an option.  Indeed, that strategy surfaced in at least 
some iterations of ENDA, which relied on Congress’s spending power to 
render acceptance of federal funding “for any program or activity of a State” a 
 
 87 See Jeremy Brinster, Note, Taking Congruence and Proportionality Seriously, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
580, 595–599 (2020) (recounting the history of this legislation); see also H. REP. NO. 110–406, 2-10 
(1996) (recounting this history up to the 110th Congress). 
 88 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
89  Throughout this period there appeared to be no serious concern about the constitutionality, under 
the Commerce Clause, of ENDA’s applicability to private employers (including the applicability of 
any retrospective relief provisions).  This is unsurprising, since even Lopez recognized broad 
congressional power to regulate economic activity, including, presumably, the employer-employee 
relationship.  
 90 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 
627 (1999); College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 666 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62 (2000) (all 5-4 opinions ruling for states in 
federalism cases). 
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waiver of that state’s sovereign immunity to claims arising under the statute.
91
  
Nevertheless, despite the availability of what appeared, in the post-South 
Dakota v. Dole92 period, to be an easy constitutional path to enacting 
retrospective remedies against states,
93
 most post-Seminole Tribe versions of 
ENDA focused on the enforcement power foundation for the law.  This 
emphasis is interesting in itself, at it suggests the enforcement power’s 
rhetorical attractiveness as the constitutional home for anti-discrimination 
legislation.
94
  More generally, the difficulty of the Commerce Clause route and 
the apparent attractiveness of the Enforcement Clause path combined to 
create a situation in which the discussions about ENDA’s constitutional 
foundations largely took the form, not of a comparison of the commerce and 
enforcement powers as distinct and equally plausible sources of congressional 
power to enact the law’s remedies, but instead of a focused argument that 
ENDA was constitutional as an application of the enforcement power.
95
 
Such application was complicated by the evolution of both that 
enforcement power jurisprudence and the Court’s underlying sexual 
orientation equality jurisprudence.  Consider first the enforcement power 
issue.  Before the 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,96 the relevant 
enforcement power analysis was governed by the generous standards of cases 
such as Katzenbach v. Morgan97 and City of Rome v. United States.98  Between 
 
 91 E.g., H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 11(b)(1).  To complicate matters further, these waiver provisions 
effectively resurrected the Commerce Clause foundation for the full versions of ENDA—that is, the 
versions that included the full panoply of remedies Congress sought to impose on states.  Whether 
one calls this situation “avoidance”—that is, avoidance of Seminole Tribe—or application—that is, 
application of the Court’s congressional spending power jurisprudence—is more a matter of semantics 
than substance. 
 92 Supra note 30. 
 93 See, e.g., Andrew Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending Paradox, 2013 WISC. L. 
REV. 339, 348 (2013) (“The consensus view of commentators, supported by twenty-five years of 
decisions following Dole, was that the decision represented a blank check to Congress.”). 
 94 See Schmidt, supra note 50 (noting a similar intuition among the congresspersons considering the 
CRA). 
 95 See Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 
34 (2000) (“The changes wrought in both the Commerce Clause and the sovereign immunity 
doctrines have one clear corollary: to place at center stage the scope of congressional authority under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  By a process of doctrinal elimination, Section Five [of 
the Fourteenth Amendment] seems to have become . . . the primary path by which Congress can 
supercede [sic] the states’ sovereign immunity.”).  Nevertheless, the qualifier “largely” is required due 
to the continued existence of the spending power as a source of power, not to enact ENDA, but to 
make its remedies effective despite Seminole Tribe.  See supra note 91. 
 96 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 97 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 98 446 U.S. 156 (1980).  Rome considered Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, but during 
this period it was not thought that different standards governed the different Enforcement Clauses.  
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1997 and 2001, Boerne’s more restrictive “congruence and proportionality” 
standard governed, but questions remained about how stringently the Court 
would apply that test.  Finally, by 2001, the Court’s application of Boerne to 
equal protection-enforcing legislation made it clear that ENDA would face 
difficult questions in an enforcement power challenge.
99
  In particular, those 
applications of Boerne established that the suspectness of the discrimination 
the enforcement legislation targeted would be a crucial consideration in the 
Court’s evaluation of that legislation’s constitutionality. 
While the relevant enforcement power doctrine was evolving, so too was 
the Court’s attitude toward sexual orientation discrimination. Until 1996, LGB 
persons
100
 had never won a constitutional victory at the Court;
101
 indeed, until 
2003, it remained constitutional to criminalize same-sex intimacy.
102
  Thus, any 
consideration of ENDA as enforcement legislation required a more explicit 
congressional statement affirming their equal protection rights, to make up for 
the lack of any such statement in Supreme Court caselaw.  Romer v. Evans103 
and Lawrence v. Texas,104 not to mention the marriage cases some years later,105 
clearly altered the constitutional status of sexual orientation.
106
  But they still 
left that status unclear.  Those cases never even broached the question whether 
sexual orientation discrimination was a suspect or quasi-suspect class, let alone 
 
The Civil Rights Cases posed no threat to ENDA’s constitutionality as enforcement legislation, since 
the only issue on which the enforcement power mattered was ENDA’s direct application to states. 
 99 See, e.g., Garrett 531 U.S. at 356 (applying skeptical scrutiny to the enforcement power argument for 
the employment provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (applying similarly skeptical scrutiny to the analogous argument for the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act). 
 100 The constitutional status of transgender discrimination—the “T” in “LGBT”—presents a distinct, 
though related, question.  This summary of Congress’s deliberations on ENDA omits consideration 
of that question, since throughout much of the period under discussion ENDA was limited to sexual 
orientation discrimination and did not purport to address gender identity discrimination. 
 101 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado law that denied LGB persons 
protected status under state law). 
 102 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas law criminalizing same-sex 
intimacy, and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which had upheld a Georgia 
sodomy law challenged as an unconstitutional infringement on LGB persons’ right to such intimacy). 
 103 Supra note 101. 
 104 Supra note 102. 
 105 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (striking down same-sex marriage bans); United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down a federal law defining marriage, for federal law 
purposes, as the union of one man and one woman). 
 106 Lawrence rested on a due process ground, but Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion nevertheless 
imported equality considerations into his analysis.  See 539 U.S. at 575 (“Equality of treatment and 
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty 
are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”); see also 
id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concurring in the decision to strike down the Texas law on 
equal protection grounds). 
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decided that it was.  Indeed, they provided little discussion of sexual 




Given that the Court’s post-Boerne equal protection enforcement power 
jurisprudence turned heavily on the answer to the suspect class question,
108
 this 
string of gay rights victories nevertheless left unclear how steep a climb ENDA 
would face if its enforcement power foundation was challenged.  However, the 
example set by Board of Trustees v. Garrett,109 where the Court dismissed the 
significance, for enforcement power purposes, of the Court’s rational 
basis/animus decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,110 
suggested that Romer’s analogous rational basis/animus analysis, and, later, the 
equally opaque constitutional analyses in the marriage cases, might not suffice 
to place sexual orientation equality legislation on a firm enforcement power 
foundation. 
2. Congress’s Response 
Given these ambiguities, it is instructive to note Congress’s elaborate 
attempts to defend ENDA as an application of the Court’s enforcement power 
and equal protection jurisprudence.
111
  That application faced obstacles.  By 
2001, it was clear that the Court would look skeptically at any equal protection 
enforcement legislation that targeted discrimination against non-suspect 
classifications, such as sexual orientation.
112
  Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, 
much of Congress’s argumentation about ENDA’s constitutionality focused 
on establishing that sexual orientation was indeed a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification.
113
  This was not a far-fetched argument in the late 1990s and early 
2000s; at that point, the Court’s last serious application of suspect class analysis 
 
 107 See, e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 763–774 (focusing on marriage); but see Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 660–
662; (discussing the history of sexual orientation discrimination). 
 108 See infra note 123. 
 109 531 U.S. at 366–367, 366 n.4. 
 110 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 111 Even after the cutbacks on the commerce power in Lopez and Morrison, it remained clear that 
ENDA’s focus on employment rendered it valid under the Commerce Clause, including its 
application to state government employers, even if, after Seminole Tribe, that grounding did not 
allow the imposition of retrospective remedies against states.  See Harry Litman & Mark D. 
Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of 
Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 977 (1997) (commenting on Lopez’s 
limited effect on congressional power). 
 112 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 113 See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Ensuring Opportunity for all Americans, 111th 
Cong. 124–127 (2009) (statement of ACLU); H. R. REP. NO. 110-406, at 29 (2007) (stating that LGB 
persons satisfy the traditional criteria for suspect class status). 
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lay only a decade-and-a-half in the past,
114
 and the then-recent decision in 
Romer v. Evans115 gave observers reason to think that formal suspect class 
status was simply a matter of time.
116
 
Despite the plausibility of Congress’s suspect class argument, it is striking 
to see Congress attempting to conform its legislation, not to underlying 
constitutional meaning, but to doctrinal rules, such as the suspect class/tiered 
scrutiny structure, that courts created to implement that meaning.  As Justice 
Breyer pointed out in his Garrett dissent, those doctrinal rules are grounded 
in justices’ (appropriate) concerns about their lack of both democratic 
legitimacy and institutional competence to second-guess legislative 
classifications.  As such, he observed, those rules should play no limiting role 
when Congress acts via enforcement legislation.
117
  Scholars have agreed, 
criticizing what Robert Post and Reva Siegel have called the Garrett majority’s 
“juricentric” understanding of the enforcement power.
118
 
For our purposes, the most relevant observation is that Congress’s 
embrace of such doctrine-based arguments—such as the argument that sexual 
orientation is a suspect classification—risks elevating such judicial decision 
rules to the status of core constitutional meaning.  Put slightly differently, that 
embrace creates the risk that Congress, when staking out its enforcement 
power authority, implicitly accepts the terms of debate set by the Court. 
However, Congress’s constitutional defense of ENDA also sought to apply 
more fundamental constitutional law.  Beyond the suspect class argument, 
another marked feature of ENDA’s defense was Congress’s insistence that 
sexual orientation employment discrimination is irrational and thus 
unconstitutional, a conclusion that thereby justified ENDA as enforcement 
legislation.
119
  At one level, this argument was just as doctrine-specific as the 
suspect class argument.  After all, rational basis review constitutes part of the 
tiered scrutiny structure to which the suspect class idea is inextricably tied.  
Thus, arguing that sexual orientation-based employment discrimination was 
 
 114 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 115 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 116 See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Principled Silence, 106 YALE L.J. 247, 250 (1996) (arguing that 
the example of sex discrimination, which proceeded from a rational basis strike-down to an argument 
for conferral of suspect class status, could be applied to sexual orientation in light of Romer). 
 117 See 531 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking 
to determine facts relevant to the exercise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that 
reflect a court’s institutional limitations.”). 
 118 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric 
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003). 
 119 See, e.g., H. R. REP. NO. 110-406, at 15 (2007). 
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irrational essentially slotted ENDA into that doctrinal structure, allowing 
Congress to create remedies for unconstitutional discrimination. 
But Congress’s insistence on the irrationality of sexual orientation 
employment discrimination also spoke to a deeper and broader constitutional 
law rule, one that transcends the suspect class/tiered scrutiny doctrinal 
structure.  A fundamental rule of equal protection—indeed, of constitutional 
law more generally—requires that government regulate only in pursuit of a 
public purpose.
120
  If we understand the rationality requirement
121
 in those 
terms—that is, as stating a core constitutional commitment rather than a 
judicially-crafted decision rule—then Congress’s insistence that sexual 
orientation employment discrimination is irrational becomes understandable 
as an attempt to pierce the doctrinal veil of suspect class/tiered scrutiny 
analysis, and to justify ENDA as an application of that core commitment. 
3. ENDA’s Lessons 
Because ENDA was never enacted, and now has been mooted by judicial 
decision,
122
 we will never know how the Court would have responded to 
Congress’s constitutional arguments.  Still, the ENDA example reveals that a 
successful application strategy requires that the Court be willing to defer to 
Congress’s argumentation, about either the Court’s doctrinal rules (the 
argument for suspect class status for sexual orientation) or the core 
constitutional law those rules implement (the argument that sexual orientation 
employment discrimination is irrational). 
The Court’s post-Boerne enforcement power jurisprudence makes clear 
that such deference is not forthcoming.  Indeed, the only time since Boerne 
 
 120 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of 
Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 228–29 (2011) (“Rational-basis scrutiny, as traditionally 
understood, flows from a presupposition of American constitutionalism so basic and pervasive that 
it is easy to overlook: in its dealings with persons, the American government is under a constitutional 
obligation to act rationally.  Rationality in turn requires both that public actions make sense and that 
they make good sense, that they have some legitimate purpose.”) (emphasis in original). 
121  Note that the text speaks of a “rationality” requirement, not the “rational basis” standard.  That latter 
standard, with all its presumptions in favor of the challenged legislative action, is a component of the 
tiered scrutiny structure this Article identifies as a judicial decision aid, rather than a core 
constitutional rule.  Compare Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the rational 
basis standard as a judicial decision aid) with Powell, supra. note 120 (discussing the rationality 
requirement as a core constitutional commitment).  
 122 See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding that Title VII of the CRA’s prohibition 
on sex discrimination in employment prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity).  Subsequent gay rights legislation, such as the currently-pending Equality Act, would extend 
anti-discrimination protections to realms not covered by the holding in Bostock.  See, e.g., Human 
Rights Campaign, “The Equality Act,’ https://www.hrc.org/resources/the-equality-act.  
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that the Court has shown such deference is when Congress legislates to protect 
a group the Court itself has denominated as suspect or quasi-suspect.
123
  The 
irony, of course, is that such deference therefore rests on an initial suspect 
class determination that remains the Court’s to make.  More fundamentally, 
the Court’s insistence on pegging the deference it accords enforcement 
legislation to the Court-announced scrutiny tier it assigns the discrimination 
that legislation targets reflects an unwillingness to allow Congress to transcend 
the tiered scrutiny structure.  To repeat Justice Breyer’s complaint in Garrett, 
that structure reflects healthy judicial self-restraint rather than core 
constitutional meaning.
124
  As such, it should not play a determinative role in 
deciding enforcement power cases or even deciding how much deference 
Congress enjoys when it enacts enforcement legislation. 
By contrast, the irrationality argument Congress made in its ENDA 
defense could be interpreted as a congressional attempt to apply core 
constitutional meaning.  However, given the Court’s unwillingness to allow 
Congress a meaningful role in implementing even the judicial decision rules 
reflected in its tiered scrutiny structure, there is little reason to be optimistic 
that it would share its power to state and apply core constitutional meaning.  
Without meaningful deference, this variant of the application approach 
remains limited indeed. 
D. The Partial-Birth Abortion Act 
A decade after its deliberations on VAWA, Congress considered a very 
different piece of legislation, the PBABA—a bill banning so-called partial-birth 
abortions.
125
  While such legislation had been considered in the 1990s, federal 
action became increasingly important to anti-abortion forces after the 
Supreme Court struck down an analogous Nebraska restriction in 2000.  The 
five-justice majority in that case, Stenberg v. Carhart,126 faulted the state law for 
both its vagueness and its failure to include an exception for women’s health.  
That latter failing was particularly relevant to abortion rights doctrine, given 




 123 See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“Because the standard for 
demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our 
rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations” 
justifying sex equality enforcement legislation) (citation omitted). 
 124 See supra note 117; see also supra note 118 (similar critique from scholars). 
 125 Supra note 39. 
 126 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 127 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). 
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and the trial court’s finding in Stenberg that the outlawed abortion method was 
sometimes the safest one for some women.
128
 
Congress, when it turned to abortion legislation in Stenberg’s aftermath, 
had little difficulty with the vagueness issue, crafting legislation defining the 
prohibited procedure more precisely.  But the latter obstacle posed a more 
serious problem.  Stenberg’s conclusion that the Constitution required a 
health exception seemed to mean that any absolute or rigid prohibition on 
“partial-birth” abortions, no matter how finely-crafted, would encounter 
resistance at the Court.
129
  Unsurprisingly, then, Congress’s constitutional 
argumentation turned heavily on what the PBABA characterized as Congress’s 




More interesting from an enforcement power perspective are the 
admittedly sparse statements in Congress’s deliberations suggesting that the 
PBABA enforced Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Because the PBABA 
limited the availability of certain types of abortions, it is most naturally 
understood as limiting constitutionally-protected rights.  However, during its 
consideration of the PBABA Congress and individual congresspersons 
sometimes suggested that the law sought to protect constitutionally-cognizable 
rights to life.  Most notably, one of the statute’s findings concluded: 
A child that is completely born is a full, legal person entitled to 
constitutional protections afforded a “person” under the United States 
Constitution. Partial-birth abortions involve the killing of a child that is 
in the process, in fact mere inches away from, becoming a “person.” 
Thus, the government has a heightened interest in protecting the life 
of the partially-born child.”
131
 
Such a finding hints at a congressional conclusion that the PBABA could 
be justified as prophylactic legislation designed to enforce the Fourteenth 




 128 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 928–29, 936–37 (describing those findings and their implications for the 
Court’s decision). 
129  The PABA itself was not an absolute ban, as it exempted from the ban situations where the 
woman’s life was at risk. See infra. note 135. 
 130 Partial-Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105 §§ 2(6)-(12). 
 131 Id. at § 2(14)(H). 
 132 This language could easily be read as recognizing the state’s interest in valuing the potentiality of post-
natal life inherent in the fetus—an interest Casey recognized.  See 505 U.S. at 871 (acknowledging 
“the interest of the State in the protection of potential life.”).  If that that interest belongs to the state, 
rather than the fetus itself, it would be non-cognizable as a Fourteenth Amendment interest, and thus 
also for enforcement power purposes.  Nevertheless, individual congresspersons appeared interested 
in locating the interest in the fetus itself, thus triggering Congress’s Section 5 authority.  See, e.g., 114 
CONG. REC. S10,491 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (“[A] legislative ban on 
partial-birth abortions is constitutional.  Indeed, allowing this life-taking procedure to continue would 
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To be sure, this language—aside from its sparseness—cannot be understood 
as a full-on challenge to Supreme Court doctrine.  It would constitute such a 
challenge only if it reflected a blunt congressional assertion of fetal 
personhood.  In Roe v. Wade, the Court explicitly rejected that proposition,133 
a move it acknowledged as critical to any recognition of an abortion right.134  
An assertion in the PBABA of fetal personhood would thus have directly 
challenged the abortion right, except perhaps when the pregnancy threatened 
the woman’s very life, in which case that assertion would have created a need 
to choose between the lives of two “persons”—the woman and the 
(congressionally-recognized) fetus.
135
  A clearer challenge to the Court’s 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment would be hard to imagine, even 
without also adding the state action problem attending any enforcement statute 
prohibiting private parties from performing or procuring abortions.
136
 
Again, though, the careful drafting of the finding quoted above
137
 indicates 
a less direct challenge to the Court’s abortion rights jurisprudence.  At most,
138
 
it suggests instead an enforcement power argument resting on Congress’s 
power to enact prophylactic legislation
139
 protecting post-natal life.  Such an 
argument flows from both the PBABA’s finding that a fetus aborted pursuant 
to the prohibited method was “mere inches away from . . . becoming a person” 
and its finding that the prohibited method “blurs the line between abortion 
 
be inconsistent with our obligation under section 5 of the 14th Amendment to protect life.”).  See 
also David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 113 n.242 (1997) (recounting a congressperson’s statement 
grounding the PBABA in the enforcement power). 
 133 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–59 (1973). 
 134 See id. at 156–57 (“If this suggestion of [fetal] personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of 
course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment.”). 
 135 The PBABA does not raise this issue, because it exempts from its prohibition situations where the 
woman’s life depends on performance of the otherwise-prohibited procedure.  18 U.S.C. § 1531(a). 
 136 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3.  But see Keith Alexander, Federalism, Abortion, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power: Can Congress Ban Partial-Birth Abortions After 
Carhart?, 13 TEX. REV. OF L. & POLITICS 105, 126–36 (2008) (acknowledging the PBABA’s state 
action problem but suggesting that it could be overcome if Congress made it applicable only to states 
that did not already ban partial-birth abortions).  While that argument might answer Morrison’s 
objection that VAWA applied nationwide, not just in states experiencing gender-biased law 
enforcement, see supra note 79, it does not answer Morrison’s other objection that the Civil Rights 
Cases and analogous precedent enforced a state action requirement even when the regulated private 
conduct was encouraged or otherwise facilitated by government action.  See 529 U.S. at 624–25. 
 137 Supra note 131. 
 138 See supra note 132 (explaining how the language could be understood as not implicating the 
enforcement power at all). 
 139 Kimel, 528 U.S. at, 81 (allowing Congress to enact enforcement legislation “prohibiting a somewhat 
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text”). 
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and infanticide in the killing of a partially-born child just inches from birth.”
140
  
On this reasoning, the enforcement power foundation for the law would rest 
on the claim that Congress was merely applying (by prophylactically 




Still, even mere prophylactic protection of post-natal life collides with the 
judicially-recognized right to a late-term abortion if required for the woman’s 
health.  Of course, Congress found that women’s health never required such 
abortions,
142
 and the Court deferred to those findings despite their 
suspiciousness.
143
  On a reading of the PBABA as enforcement legislation, 
those findings thus play two closely-related, indeed, mirror-image roles: 
defeating a Casey-based abortion-rights attack and averting any collision 
between the woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right and the post-natal right-
to-life this argument assumes Congress was prophylactically enforcing. 
Ultimately, the parties challenging the PBABA focused entirely on the 
abortion rights issue, rather than the congressional power issue.
144
  Thus, it is 
impossible to know how an enforcement power or commerce power challenge 
would have fared.
145
  Indeed, a commerce power challenge to the PBABA 
presents a fascinating counter-factual: Justices Thomas and Justice Scalia, two 
of the bare majority of five justices voting to uphold the PBABA in Gonzales 
v. Carhart, expressly reserved the commerce power question, observing that it 
had been neither raised nor briefed by the parties.
146
  That uncertainty suggests 
another variant on the application strategy—one focused not on the 
enforcement power, but rather, the commerce power itself.  Congress seems 
to have embraced that variant when it almost literally applied the Commerce 
 
 140 Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(O) (2003). 
 141 To repeat, the prophylactic nature of this claim would not avoid the collision between that 
prophylactic protection of post-natal life and the woman’s right to an abortion for reasons other than 
protecting her life.  See text accompanying supra notes 134–32.  Nor would it solve the state action 
problem.  See supra note 136. 
 142 Act Pub. L. 108-105 § 2(2), (5), (13), (14) (2003). 
 143 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166–67 (2007) (majority deference); id. at 174–80 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (critiquing Congress’s findings). 
 144 See generally Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why 
Progressives Might be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (2006) 
(discussing that choice). 
 145 The PBABA prohibited any doctor from knowingly performing the prohibited procedure “in or 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).  Congress’s deliberations about the 
Commerce Clause foundation for the law were, however, if anything more cursory than those 
attending its consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment foundation.  See, e.g., Alissa Schecter, 
Choosing Balance: Congressional Powers and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2010 (2005) (noting the paucity of congressional deliberation on the issue). 
 146 550 U.S. at 168 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Clause by limiting the PBABA’s prohibition to those abortions performed “in 
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”
147
 
III.  ADAPTATION STRATEGIES 
Part I introduced three strategies—challenge, avoidance, and application—
that Congress can employ when confronting either a hostile Court or hostile 
precedent as it legislates to promote individual rights.  Part II’s case studies 
illustrate those strategies.  This Part examines what those case studies reveal 
about their benefits and drawbacks. 
A. Challenges 
The deliberations over the Civil Rights Act’s public accommodations 
provisions reveal political actors contemplating a direct challenge to judicial 
doctrine or the justices themselves.  The CRA example illustrates how these 
two targets are distinct: the debate on those provisions occurred against a 
backdrop of hostile judicial precedent (the Civil Rights Cases’ state action 
requirement) but also a Court that was suspected to be potentially amenable 





 147 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).  For a critique of this application attempt, see Kopel and Reynolds, supra note 
132 at 111 (“Unless a physician is operating a mobile abortion clinic on the Metroliner, it is not really 
possible to perform an abortion ‘in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.’”).  Notwithstanding 
this critique, it is generally accepted that Congress’s use of the “in or affecting” language reflects its 
intention to exercise its commerce regulatory power its fullest reach.  See, e.g., United States v. Yucel, 
97 F. Supp. 3d 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“the phrase ‘in or affecting interstate commerce’ is a term 
of art used by Congress to signal that it is exercising its pull power under the Commerce Clause.”).  
Given that understanding, one can view Congress’s use of that term in the PBABA as reflecting a 
desire both to assert its regulatory power to its constitutional limit and, if possible, to forestall a powers 
attack on the law by definitionally limiting its applicability to conduct the Clause gives Congress the 
power to regulate.  Essentially, the latter claim would amount to an argument that the “in or affecting” 
language constitutes the sort of jurisdictional element Lopez identified as tending to validate a claim 
of congressional power.  See 514 U.S. at 561-562. At least one scholar has questioned the correctness 
of such an argument.  See Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 203 and the Commerce 
Clause, 20 CONST’L COMM. 441, 456-461 (2003-04).  This Article’s limited consideration of this 
issue does not require passing on this argument, other than to observe that Congress’s use of the “in 
or affecting” language could be understood as a congressional attempt (successful or not) to tie the 
PBABA’s reach explicitly to the reach of its commerce power, and thus as an attempt at literal 
application of that power. 
 148 The Justices’ accommodating beliefs about congressional power to ground the public 
accommodations provisions in the enforcement power were not well-known outside the Court, and, 
according to one scholar, were only “partially revealed” in a 1964 case, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 
226 (1964), decided well after the powers issue had been settled in Congress.  Schmidt, infra. note 
163 at 809.  Nevertheless, scholars had perceived the evolution in the Court’s thinking on the state 
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A congressional challenge to judicial doctrine seeks, by definition, to create 
doctrinal change Congress favors.  Indeed, as with the CRA, such a challenge 
may present a unique opportunity to obtain such change.  But it is risky.  Most 
obviously, challenges can fail. If, for example, Congress had staked the CRA’s 
public accommodations provisions’ constitutionality solely on the 
enforcement power, and if that gambit failed, those provisions would have 
been struck down—a politically disastrous result inflicting a possibly-fatal defeat 
for the civil rights movement and reaffirming and thus strengthening the state 
action requirement Congress sought to change.  On the other hand, the very 
magnitude of those stakes might have forced the Court to find a way to uphold 
those provisions—flinching in a game of constitutional chicken. 
Of course, on such a high-stakes issue one might expect Congress to hedge 
its bets—for example, by citing the Commerce Clause as a backstop to its 
enforcement power argument.  But, as anyone familiar with the game of 
chicken understands, the more a player creates ways of avoiding the 
impending collision, the less credible it is as a competitor.  Indeed, when the 
federal government took an accommodationist position regarding the CRA’s 
enforcement power foundation, defending the public accommodations 
provisions primarily on Commerce Clause grounds with the Enforcement 
Clause functioning as merely a backstop, the majority shunted that latter 
theory aside,
149
 even though one scholar has concluded that a majority—and 
perhaps all—of the Court would have endorsed it if forced to decide.
150
  As if 
reflecting his regret with the government’s choice, Justice Black—a particularly 
strong proponent of Congress’s Section 5 authority to regulate private 
conduct
151
—hinted strongly that he would have voted to uphold the law on the 
enforcement power ground.
152
  But only Justice Douglas made a full-throated 
argument in its favor.
153
 
The enforcement power also raises troubling longer-term implications if 
Congress wields it in pursuit of its own constitutional vision.  As explained 
earlier,
154
 during deliberations on the CRA, concerns arose that grounding the 
public accommodations provisions in the Enforcement Clause might 
transform the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to fully cover private 
 
action question since at least the late 1940s.  See id. at 781-86 (noting this evolution and scholars’ and 
advocates’ reactions to it). 
 149 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250. 
 150 See Schmidt, infra note 163 at 803–04. 
 151 See id. at 806. 
 152 See 379 U.S. at 278–79 (Black, J., concurring). 
 153 See id. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 154 See supra Part II.A. 
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businesses and institutions those provisions sought to regulate.  The fear, 
expressed by Attorney General Kennedy,
155
 was that regulating those private 
entities via Section 5 enforcement legislation would convert them more 
generally into state actors for purposes of Section 1’s self-executing provisions.  
Thus, for example, he suggested that inclusion of religious schools in such 




This concern reflects the intricate relationship between enforcement 
legislation and the Court’s understanding of Section 1’s self-executing 
provisions.  Unlike Commerce Clause legislation, enforcement legislation may 
influence judicial doctrine if it reflects an alternative understanding of 
Fourteenth Amendment law.  To be sure, commerce legislation may also 
influence the shape of the Commerce Clause, for example, if the Court 
upholds the law by announcing a more expansive understanding of the 
commerce power.  But Congress’s textually-granted supervisory authority over 
the Fourteenth Amendment—its power to “enforce” that amendment—gives 
Congress much more direct control over its contours. 
That control raises difficult questions.  Understanding Congress’s Section 
5 enforcement power as authorizing Congress to enact into law its own 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment raises the question whether that 
understanding should influence, or even determine, the content of the Court’s 
Section 1 doctrine.
157
  A positive answer calls into question the Court’s 
authoritative role in declaring constitutional law.  But a negative answer 
renders constitutional doctrine inconsistent and fragmentary, with rules or 
principles enforcement legislation enacts in one context absent from contexts 
seemingly demanding similar treatment.
158
  To take Attorney General 
Kennedy’s example, a negative answer would mean that state-licensed religious 
schools would constitute state actors only for purposes of the conduct 
governed by enforcement legislation, unless the Court decided on its own—
 
 155 Supra note 53. 
 156 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that public school Bible 
readings violate the Establishment Clause). 
 157 One version of this problem is the risk that Congress could enact into enforcement legislation its 
own, more limited, understanding of constitutional rights.  In Katzenbach v. Morgan, Justice Brennan 
attempted to solve that problem by arguing that such legislation could only expand rights, not limit 
them, thereby creating a “one-way ratchet.”  See 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.  See also id. at 668 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (responding to this argument). 
 158 Cf. Freund Statement, infra note 163 (warning against “fragmentary” grants of constitutional rights). 
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To be sure, this problem need not arise, at least not in its fullest form.  
Under today’s Boerne regime, Congress’s enforcement power is explicitly 
limited to deterring or remedying violations of judicially-declared rights.  
Under that regime, valid enforcement legislation by definition remains within 
the channel cut by the Court’s own Fourteenth Amendment interpretations.  
But a milder variant of the problem still surfaces.  Congress’s authority to enact 
prophylactic legislation extending beyond the Court-stated constitutional rule
160
 
allows Congress to single out particular subject-areas (such as employment) or 
groups (such as the disabled) for regulation extending beyond what the 
Constitution requires.  The possibility of such special treatment again raises 
the issue of different constitutional treatment for groups or contexts that legal 
reasoning would group as similar.  While the character of that treatment as 
legislative rather than judicial eases the tension that differential creates, the 
strain created by the resulting Section 1-Section 5 gap persists.
161
 
Grounding the CRA’s public accommodations provisions on Congress’s 
commerce power obviated this problem.  As that option’s proponents noted, 
that power allows Congress near-complete flexibility in wielding it: subject to 
minimal due process and equal protection constraints,
162
 Congress can regulate 
some businesses but not others, or impose some types of regulations but not 
 
 159 The state actor example may not be the best one, since state action presents context-specific questions 
yielding different results applicable to the same entity.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 
345, 351 (1974) (“[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State 
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated 
as that of the State itself.”) (emphasis added).  But the problem extends beyond the state action 
question.  See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 163 at 805 (“[T]he under-examined assumption of the 
Brown Court [that Congress had the Section 5 authority to prohibit racially-segregated schools] was 
that there could be an allowable gap between Section 5 and Section 1, which could have two possible 
consequences for the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  Either the Court would be willing to 
recognize and accept this gap . . . . Or (more likely) the Court would follow Congress in redefining 
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause—that is, the congressional interpretation of equal 
protection would then be adopted by the Court as a self-enforcing constitutional right.”). 
 160 See supra note 35 
 161 See supra note 159; see also Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1189 (warning that Congress’s use 
of its enforcement power to regulate private parties would render “the responsibility on Congress . . . 
all the greater to think through the implications of its action for constitutional claims that are not 
precisely those recognized in the bill but in principle may be comparable”). 
 162 See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129–33 (1942) (noting and disposing of due process 
arguments); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (noting and disposing of equal 
protection arguments). 
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others, without creating inconsistencies in constitutional doctrine or impairing 
the Supreme Court’s integrity as the ultimate expositor of constitutional law.
163
 
The larger point is that a political branch strategy of challenging 
unfavorable Fourteenth Amendment precedent must always consider the 
larger implications of a successful challenge.  Those larger implications 
include considerations flowing from the nature of what Congress accomplishes 
when it uses its enforcement power to enact regulations that differ from the 
Court’s constitutional understanding.  Those considerations lurk even when, 
as required after Boerne, Congress purports merely to remedy or deter 
violations of that judicial doctrine. 
B. Avoidance 
Ultimately, legislators and Administration officials considering the CRA’s 
public accommodations provisions decided to deemphasize the enforcement 
power and instead rely primarily on the Commerce Clause.  That decision 
highlights another strategy—avoiding the problems that lurk in a challenge 
strategy by relying on another source of power. 
Avoidance is a natural strategy when advocates of civil rights legislation 
confront a hostile Court and/or hostile precedent.  It is feasible because, as 
noted earlier,
164
 Congress enjoys broad latitude to enact Article I-based 
legislation for reasons beyond those directly implicated by the particular grant 
of power—for example, imposing a tax for non-revenue-raising reasons and 
regulating commerce for reasons remote from any motivation to improve 
commerce itself.
165
  This non-scrutiny of motivation allows Congress to use 
these other powers to promote constitutional rights, thus avoiding any 
problems arising from use of the enforcement power. 
To be sure, avoidance raises its own concerns.  As a practical matter, every 
source of congressional power carries its own restrictions.  Those restrictions 
might well make that alternative power less desirable, by either reducing the 
scope of Congress’s regulatory reach as compared with the Enforcement 
Clause or otherwise limiting the legislation’s effectiveness.  Most notably, the 
 
 163 See, e.g., A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate 
Commerce: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Commerce Comm., 88th Cong., 1183, 1187 (1963) 
(brief of Professor Paul A. Freund) (“Freund Statement”) (The Commerce Clause “is primarily a 
grant of legislative power to Congress, which can be exercised in large or small measure, flexibly, 
pragmatically, tentatively, progressively, while guaranteed rights, if they are declared to be conferred 
by the Constitution, are not to be granted or withheld in fragments.”), quoted in Christopher Schmidt, 
The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 767, 813 (2010). 
 164 See text accompanying supra notes 19–20. 
 165 See supra notes 19–20. 
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substantive and remedial reach of today’s commerce power, while still broad, 
has been limited by cases decided over the last thirty years, especially in its 
ability to regulate states—the very feature that makes that power an attractive 
alternative to the enforcement power.
166
  While the Enforcement Clause is 
subject to separate and distinct limitations,
167
 it is either undeniably or arguably 
free from at least some of the ancillary restrictions the Court has imposed on 
Commerce Clause-based regulation of states.
168
 
Beyond these practicalities lies a more conceptual point about the 
expressive value of grounding civil rights legislation in the constitutional 
authority specifically concerned with civil rights—the enforcement power. As 
this Article noted at the outset,
169
 concerns about grounding civil rights 
legislation in the appropriate constitutional provision have surfaced since at 
least Edwards v. California in 1941.170  They resurfaced again in the debates 
over the CRA when legislators (and ultimately Justice Douglas) disposed to 
grounding its public accommodations provisions on the Enforcement Clause 
critiqued its Commerce Clause justification.
171
  It’s at least possible that the 
same critique underlay Congress’s focus, in its ENDA deliberations, on the 




This conceptual concern potentially interacts with the more practical one 
noted earlier.  A Court predisposed to trimming Congress’s commerce power 
might well find attractive targets in civil rights legislation, exactly because the 
Enforcement Clause beckons as the more intuitively obvious home for such 
laws.  To be sure, some civil rights legislation—such as the CRA or ENDA’s 
non-remedial provisions—falls within the heartland of valid Commerce Clause 
regulation.  However, other civil rights legislation could fall prey to the justices’ 
desire to further limit Congress’s Article I powers. 
 
 166 See supra note 28 (addressing limits on Article I-based regulation of states, including the provision 
of remedies against states); supra note 31 (addressing the general scope of the commerce power). 
 167 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 507 (requiring that enforcement legislation be congruent and proportional to 
the targeted constitutional violations); see also Holder, 570 U.S. at 529 (striking down a provision of 
the Voting Rights Act as Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation because it reflected outdated 
data and inappropriately imposed unequal burdens on the states). 
 168 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that, when legislating under its Enforcement 
Clause power, Congress may subject unconsenting states to lawsuits seeking retrospective relief).  See 
also Edward Hartnett, Distinguishing Permissible Preemption from Unconstitutional 
Commandeering, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 351, 375 (2020) (considering whether enforcement 
legislation is subject to the anti-commandeering principle). 
 169 See supra. Part I.A.. 
 170 See text accompanying supra notes 21–23. 
 171 See Part II.A.; Heart of Atlanta Hotel, 379 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 172 See supra note 93. 
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Most notably, United States v. Morrison’s insistence on demarcating 
regulatory fields beyond the commerce power’s reach might yield more 
unhappy results for civil rights legislation not targeting economic activity.  
Voting rights, educational equity, policing and criminal justice reform, and 
hate crimes legislation all regulate activities the Court might consider non-
economic and thus presumptively beyond the Commerce Clause’s reach.  The 
Court might be especially likely to reject the Commerce Clause foundation for 
such laws if it viewed the commerce justification as an attempt to avoid having 
to defend them on enforcement power grounds.  Indeed, the federal appellate 
court whose strike-down of VAWA was affirmed in Morrison criticized the 
litigants defending VAWA’s constitutionality on quite similar grounds.
173
 
The argument that the availability of the enforcement power as a logical 
home for a law might persuade the Court to reject its commerce power 
grounding remains highly speculative.  Nonetheless, the temptation Congress 
might feel to invoke the Commerce Clause or some other congressional 
power
174
 in order to avoid confronting the Court’s enforcement power 
jurisprudence could conceivably backfire if such attempts are perceived not 
just as congressional overreach, but overreach motivated by Congress’s 
recognition of the enforcement power’s limits. 
C. Application 
Given these risks, a third alternative naturally presents itself.  Rather than 
directly confronting hostile justices or Enforcement Clause precedent, or 
avoiding that precedent entirely, Congress may justify civil rights legislation as 
applying that precedent.  The idea is as modest as it is straightforward: 
Congress takes Court-stated Fourteenth Amendment doctrine as a given—as 
the “Amendment” Congress is authorized to enforce—and seeks merely to 
apply that law by identifying circumstances where that law is violated and/or 
remedies that, in its view, adequately punish and/or deter such violations.  
Indeed, it is not only modest and straightforward; the Court’s post-Boerne 




 173 See Brzonkola v. Va. Poly. Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Confronted by the Supreme 
Court’s intervening decision in City of Boerne v. Flores during this appeal, the appellants [defending 
the provision’s constitutionality] retreated to defend the statute primarily as an exercise, not of 
Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but of its power under the 
Commerce Clause—notwithstanding the statute’s regulation of conduct neither commercial nor 
interstate.”). 
 174 See, e.g., supra note 91 (citing one version of ENDA that sought to use Congress’s conditional 
spending power to induce states to waive their sovereign immunity). 
 175 See supra note 35. 
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Given the varying levels of generality at which one could cast Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine, much enforcement legislation could be plausibly 
defended as applying it.  Even Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, 
enfranchising citizens literate in Spanish and upheld in Morgan partially based 
on Congress’s independent constitutional interpretive authority, could 
alternatively be understood as simply applying Court-stated equal protection 
law governing English literacy tests, even though it arguably contradicted a 
previous Court decision upholding such tests.
176
 
The application justification is buttressed by institutional competence 
arguments extolling Congress’s superior capacity to find the various type of 
facts that assist the proper application of Court-stated constitutional law.
177
  
Given the inherent logic of an application approach, Boerne’s approval of it, 
the amenability of much Fourteenth Amendment doctrine to significant 
legislation plausibly defensible on that basis, and Congress’s fact-finding 
superiority, one can understand the argument favoring significant 
congressional authority to apply Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. 
Yet this straightforward argument quickly becomes clouded. First, as a 
matter of realpolitik, accurate congressional application of constitutional 
doctrine is not guaranteed to succeed when that application threatens the 
Court’s broader commitments.  Thus, the VAWA Congress’s dutiful 
inclusion of findings detailing the connection between gender-motivated 
violence and interstate commerce did not save the statute in Morrison when 
reliance on those findings to uphold the law threatened to undermine the 
Court’s agenda of crafting limits on the commerce power.
178
  That same 
federalism agenda also appeared to motivate the Morrison Court when it 
arguably moved the enforcement power goalposts by imposing a version of 
 
 176 Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).  This argument goes beyond the 
alternative, more modest, Morgan theory avoiding Lassiter, in which Section 4(e) simply enforced 
the right of New York’s Puerto Rican community to gain its fair share of government services by 
giving it a political voice.  See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652–53 (setting forth this rationale).  Rather, it 
directly engages Lassiter, but understands Section 4(e)’s ostensible challenge to Lassiter as something 
more modest—as reflecting Congress’s conclusion that, given the New York Puerto Rican 
community’s access to Spanish language news outlets, Lassiter’s recognition of government’s interest 
in an informed electorate, 360 U.S. at 51–52, did not justify disenfranchising persons Section 4(e) 
enfranchised. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653–55.  Compare id. at 654 (suggesting that Congress had 
reason to suspect that racism motivated New York’s literacy requirement); with Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 
53–54 (observing that Lassiter did not involve a race discrimination claim).  For a fuller discussion of 
this understanding of Morgan, see WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96–97, 
104 (2016). 
 177 See Araiza, Deference, infra. note 201. 
 178 See supra. notes 85–86. 
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the state action requirement not mandated by the relevant Reconstruction-era 
precedents.
179
  In short: straightforward congressional application of Court-
stated law may well fail if it threatens another value the Court cares about. 
More conceptually, the application strategy is complicated by deep 
uncertainty about the proper understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“law” Congress is authorized to enforce.
180
  This complication arose in two 
post-Boerne decisions, Kimel v. Board of Regents181 and Board of Trustees v. 
Garrett,182 striking down enforcement legislation.  Those opinions were heavily 
criticized, not just for their stringent application of Boerne’s congruence and 
proportionality requirement, but also for their equation of the “law” (to which 
the legislation had to be congruent and proportional) with the Court’s own 
institutionally-bounded, sub-constitutional doctrinal rules.
183
  As Justice Breyer 
noted in his Garrett dissent, those doctrinal rules reflect appropriate judicial 
self-restraint, rather than core constitutional law, and thus, correctly 
understood, did not limit congressional action.
184
 
ENDA’s legislative history features a congressional attempt to apply these 
sub-constitutional doctrinal rules.  As noted earlier,
185
 that history featured 
detailed analysis arguing that sexual orientation satisfies the criteria for suspect 
class status, as part of the well-known tiered scrutiny structure which scholars 
and judges persuasively argue is not itself constitutional “law.”
186
  By contrast, 
the argument in ENDA’s legislative history about the irrationality of sexual 
discrimination employment discrimination is at least susceptible to being 
understood as a congressional attempt to apply core constitutional meaning—
that is, the core equal protection rule that, when it legislates, government must 
act reasonably in pursuit of a public purpose.
187
 
This distinction matters when evaluating the “application” strategy.  A 
congressional argument that enforcement legislation applies core 
constitutional principles sends a very different message than an argument that 
such legislation applies sub-constitutional judicial decision rules such as the 
test for suspect class status.  The former argument insists that sub-
constitutional doctrine reflects merely judicially-manageable decision rules 
 
 179 See supra notes 81–82. 
 180 For a longer discussion of this issue, see Araiza, supra note 176, chs. 4–6. 
 181  528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 182   531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 183 See supra note 124. 
 184 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 382–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 185 See supra Part II.C. 
 186 See supra note 124. 
 187 See text accompanying supra notes 112–120 (recounting these arguments in more detail). 
748 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:4 
that help courts decide constitutional cases, rather than constitutional law itself.  
It thus asserts Congress’s authority to transcend such decision rules and apply 
core constitutional principles.  
By contrast, the latter argument acknowledges judicial doctrine as the 
appropriate focal point for enforcement power analysis, even if that doctrine 
merely reflects such decision rules.  If Congress argues that its legislation 
applies such decision rules, then it implicitly concedes the constitutional status 
of those rules—i.e., it acknowledges that the Court sets the terms of Congress’s 
application authority.  Because those rules flow from the Court’s sense of its 
own institutional limitations, Congress’s acceptance of those rules as the 
proper focal point for enforcement legislation abnegates its unique 
institutional authority and capacity when working with the Court on the project 
of implementing constitutional meaning.
188
 
Nevertheless, sometimes mere “applications” of Court-stated law can be 
quite aggressive, and, indeed, can come close to challenging judicial doctrine.  
Consider the PBABA.  Beyond purporting to find no serious infringement on 
the right the Court has recognized—the woman’s right to a late-term abortion 
when her health demands it
189
—the Congress that enacted the PBABA also 
sought to ground its abortion restriction on the right to life enjoyed by post-
natal persons.  Recall the House report finding both that “partially born” 
fetuses were “mere inches away from becoming a person,”
190
 and that partial-
birth abortions corroded respect for such post-natal life by “blur[ring] the line 
between abortion and infanticide.”
191
 
These findings could be read as implying congressional assertion of some 
level of constitutional right to life for fetuses—an assertion that would challenge 
Roe’s rejection of that idea and with it the foundation of a right to terminate 
fetal life.
192
  To be sure, they could also be understood as supporting a less 
aggressive decision by Congress to prophylactically safeguard the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to post-natal life by extending that protection backward, 
several “inches” before it begins.
193
  Indeed, the statute’s citation of the Court’s 
foundational abortion rights opinions
194
 suggests the superiority of this latter 
 
 188 See Araiza, supra note 176, ch. 6. 
 189 See Partial Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(B), (D), (F), (O) (finding that the 
prohibited procedure was never necessary for women’s health). The statute did provide exceptions 
for women’s lives. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a). 
 190 Supra note 131. 
 191 Supra note 140. 
 192 See supra note 134 (quoting Roe’s recognition of the implications for abortion rights of recognizing 
the constitutional status of fetal life). 
 193 See text accompanying supra notes 139–140 (presenting this argument in more detail). 
 194 See Partial Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(H). 
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reading. But even construing the PBABA as this more modest, prophylactic 
application of the judicially-recognized right to post-natal life nevertheless 
steers the statute on a collision course with the (similarly judicially-recognized) 
right to a late-term abortion for health reasons. 
Of course, the PBABA’s authors addressed the women’s health issue—
probably not as part of the underdeveloped enforcement power argument just 
sketched out, but rather, more straightforwardly, in response to Stenberg v. 
Carhart’s insistence that all abortion regulations provide exceptions for 
women’s health.
195
  The statute’s response to that insistence—that the PBABA 
did not require a health exception because the prohibited procedure was never 
necessary for women’s health—raises the final issue the application strategy 
implicates: the deference due Congress when it purports to apply Court-stated 
constitutional law.
196
  While the deference question arose in the PBABA in the 
course of the Court’s examination of a statute attacked as rights-limiting,
197
 the 
same question arises in the context of rights-promoting legislation.
198
  As with 
the rights-limiting context of the challenge to the PBABA, the level of 
deference courts accord legislative conclusions (including fact-findings) largely 
determines the fate of rights-promoting legislation grounded on such 
conclusions. 
The Court’s approach to the deference question in the enforcement power 
context turns on a variety of issues.
199
  Most importantly for current purposes, 
its insistence that enforcement legislation hew closely to the Court’s own sub-
constitutional decision rules has rendered it skeptical of Congress’s findings 
when that legislation targets either constitutional wrongs those rules identify as 
less serious or the core constitutional commitment of rational government 
action.
200
  More generally, the Court’s approach to the deference question is 
deeply problematic.  The analysis is intricate and far beyond the scope of this 
Article, but suffice it to say that the Court’s approach to this question is marked 
 
 195 See supra notes 126-127. 
 196 In the PBABA example, that application could be understood as application of either the Court’s 
abortion rights jurisprudence or the post-natal right-to-life enforcement argument the text sketches 
out. 
197   See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165–67. 
 198 See generally Araiza, Deference, infra. note 201. 
 199 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Araiza, Deference, infra. note 201. 
 200 See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368–72 (applying skeptical review of Congress’s findings relating to the 
underlying constitutionality of a form of discrimination that received only rational basis judicial 
review).  Compare Hibbs, supra note 123 (stating that “it was easier” for Congress to amass the 
required factual showing when it legislated to combat sex discrimination rather than disability 
discrimination, because sex discrimination is a judicially-recognized quasi-suspect classification). 
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by inconsistency and poorly-theorized understandings of the proper roles of 
Court and Congress in reaching such conclusions.
201
 
Unless and until the Court creates and applies a more coherent approach 
to the deference question, the application option will remain a complex one 
with uncertain prospects in any given case.  Its complexity and uncertainty are 
exacerbated by the Court’s manipulation of its deference analysis to account 
for the degree to which enforcement legislation attempts to apply, not the 
Court’s own institutionally-limited doctrine implementing the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but that Amendment’s core law. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
One basic lesson these historical examples teach for future civil rights 
legislation is that no path is guaranteed to succeed.  Challenging the Court or 
its doctrine risks losing.  Avoiding that doctrine runs the risk of encountering 
completely different landmines threatening the legislation.  Indeed, it risks 
creating such landmines if the Court perceives the avoidance tactic as an 
attempt to circumvent judicial doctrine blocking more obvious doctrinal 
foundations, and responds by trimming the alternative power.  Finally, 
applying the Court’s doctrine traps Congress into playing the Court’s game, 
unless the Court defers to Congress when it seeks to apply not just court-
created doctrine but core constitutional rules—something it has not been 
willing to do since Boerne. 
One can say more about challenges.  Generally, challenges to the Court 
and its doctrine are less likely to succeed today, given the Court’s Boerne-
fueled insistence on judicial supremacy, not just in stating constitutional 
meaning, but in implementing that meaning via doctrinal rules such as suspect 
class determinations.  But such statements must be more granular to be 
accurate. A Court, like today’s, that is already on a mission—say, to restrict 
abortion rights or increase free religious exercise rights—will likely be 
amenable to such “challenges” to its existing doctrine, just as the early 1960s 
Warren Court was not just amenable but eager to follow Congress’s lead on 
the state action issue as soon as Congress grasped the reins.  When the Court 
“defers” to Congress only when Congress is already moving in the Court’s 
preferred direction, “challenges” succeed only when they challenge doctrine 
 
 201 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 
84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (1999) (“[T]he concept of deference remains malleable, indeterminate, 
and not well-defined.”).  See generally William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding 
in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013); Araiza, supra. 
note 176, ch. 7. 
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the Court is already moving away from.
202
  After Boerne, that is truer than ever 
before. 
Avoidance also carries particular risks today.  Today’s Court is not one 
presumptively friendly to Congress’s exercise of its Article I powers.  If 
Congress seeks to use its commerce power to regulate in pursuit of civil rights, 
it should expect careful judicial scrutiny unless the law remains within the 
heartland of that power.  After National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius,203 one might even expect that same skepticism when Congress uses 
its spending power.
204
  Any cutbacks the Court might impose on those powers 
would not, of course, remain confined to civil rights legislation. 
That leaves application. Application seems a benign strategy.  Yet it risks 
conceding to the Court the authority to set the terms of Congress’s 
enforcement power, if that strategy requires Congress to frame its application 
by reference to the Court’s own constitutional decision rules.  That term-
setting concession cripples Congress’s authority to stake out stronger positions 
on civil rights issues than could the Court, confined by own institutional 
limitations. 
Today, civil rights legislative initiatives stand at the forefront of the national 
conversation in a way not seen since the 1960s.  But unlike then, today the 
Court is far more skeptical, not only of the obvious, Enforcement Clause-
based, foundation for such laws, but of their alternative Article I foundations 
as well.
205
  That skepticism demands that Congress think long and hard as it 
decides where and how to ground civil rights legislation.  Those decisions will 
determine the fate of such legislation.  The stakes are high. 
  
 
 202 Cf. supra. note 44 (noting the mid-Century Court’s tentative undermining of the state action rule). 
 203 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 204 See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (2013) (citing scholars recognizing the importance of the spending power issue 
in National Federation). 
 205 Cf. Schmidt, supra. note 163 at 813 (citing President Kennedy’s Solicitor General’s confidence that 
the CRA’s public accommodations provisions would be upheld as valid Commerce Clause 
legislation). 
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